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Abstract: A load frequency control (LFC) scheme for modern power systems employs an
open communication network to transmit control/measurement signals. The usage of the
open communication network in power system makes the LFC scheme more vulnerable to
communication network attacks, for example a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. This attack will
prevent a certain amount of transmission of the signals so as to degrade the performance of
LFC scheme, or even to lead to instability of power system. Therefore, this paper concerns LFC
scheme for single-area power system with energy-limited DoS attack based on switching method.
Compared with the latest schemes only considering duration of a DoS attacks, the proposed LFC
takes fully into account both the duration and attack frequency of the DoS attack. A switching
LFC model for a single-area power system is firstly constructed based on the characteristic
of periodical sampling and DoS attacks. Then, an exponential stability criterion is developed
in terms of the duration and frequency of a DoS attack. Next, a feasible controller of LFC
scheme is derived by solving linear matrix inequalities in the criterion. Finally, a detailed design
algorithm of LFC scheme is presented for a known DoS attack or an unknown DoS attack.
The effectiveness of the proposed LFC scheme is evaluated on a single-area power system under
DoS attacks. The proposed LFC scheme is compared with a robust LFC scheme and an event-
triggered H∞ LFC scheme. The obtained contrasting results demonstrate that the proposed
LFC scheme can defend DoS attacks with limited energy, and can perform better control effect
in the presence of load fluctuations.
Keywords: Power system, Load frequency control, Open communication network, Switching
system, DoS attacks, Exponential stability.
1. INTRODUCTION
As one of the most essential operational functions of
power systems, load frequency control (LFC) is widely
used for frequency regulation (Kudur [1994]). In an in-
terconnected power system, the main objective of LFC
is to restore the balance between load and generation in
each control area (Shayeghi et al. [2009]). Traditionally,
an LFC scheme employs dedicated channels to transmit
control signals and measurements. Yet, with the existence
of geographically distributed generators and the increased
competition among third party or bilateral contracts in
a modern electricity market, an open communication in-
frastructure has been widely studied in LFC scheme to
support the increasingly decentralized property of control
services (referring to Shayeghi et al. [2007] and Zhang
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et al. [2013b]). However, the application of open network
technology in the power grid makes the LFC system more
vulnerable to various network attacks. Such attacks may
cause a serious impact on system stability and even social
stability. Typical cases are that the management system
of supervisory control and data acquisition distribution
in Ukrainian was attacked by a foreign attacker as noted
in Lee et al. [2016] and an Iranian nuclear power station
at Natanz was attacked by StuxNet virus as reported
in Farwell et al. [2011]. The Ukrainian blackout affected
approximately 225, 000 customers, while the attacks in
the Iranian resulted in 60% hosts damaged. Therefore, it
is urgent to solve the adverse effects caused by network
attacks for an effective LFC scheme.
A denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is one of network at-
tacks. DoS attacks corrupt the availability by blocking
the transmission medium, which results in the loss of
useful information. Up to date, many researchers have
made significant effort on the LFC scheme to defend DoS
attacks. Regarding DoS attacks as networked induced sent
disturbances, some robust LFC schemes for interconnected
power system have been developed in Dong et al. [2012]
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and Zhang et al. [2013a]. Yet, such robust schemes did
not consider the detailed model of DoS attack to design
LFC scheme. Different from the above scheme, by intro-
ducing DoS attacks into modeling of LFC scheme, Liu
et al. [2013] proved that the existence of DoS attacks
make the dynamics of a power system unstable, including
convergence and steady-state errors, based on switched
system theories. By considering the effect of energy-limited
DoS attacks, Peng et al. [2016] designed a resilient event-
triggered communication scheme that allows a degree of
packet losses induced by DoS attacks. Further work can
be found in Zhou et al. [2019] and Liu et al. [2019]. Cheng
et al. [2020] noted that both studies in Liu et al. [2013]
and in Peng et al. [2016] employ single loop LFC scheme
without the additional control, and thus a resilient design
of additional control law for a multi-area power system
is proposed. An unknown input functional observer based
optimal LFC approach was presented to handle network
attacks in Alhelou et al. [2019]. To detect and defend the
DoS attacks, Wang et al. [2019] established a co-simulation
technology-based platform. A deep auto-encoder extreme
learning machine algorithm was introduced to predict and
supplement lost data, and thus to ensure the normal oper-
ation of the LFC system in Li et al. [2019]. However, most
of the above methods focus on the stability analysis of LFC
scheme, considering only the durations of DoS attacks. The
useful and significant information of DoS attacks, attack
frequency, has not yet been introduced to design an LFC
scheme. The analysis of attack frequency is helpful for the
detection of DoS attack in LFC process. Therefore, the
stability and design of LFC scheme under DoS attacks have
not been fully investigated, which motivates this research
effort.
Based on the above discussions, this paper explores the
stability analysis and the controller design of LFC scheme
for a single-area power system under energy-limited DoS
attacks. The proposed LFC scheme considers fully the
attack frequency of DoS attack, which is different from
the existing schemes considering only the attack duration
in Peng et al. [2016] and Cheng et al. [2020]. Considering
both the frequency and the duration can more accurately
characterize the process of DoS attacks, so that the sta-
bility analysis and controller design of LFC scheme are
more effective. An exponential stability criterion and a
controller design algorithm are developed for LFC scheme
with the aid of the switching method in Zhang et al. [2008].
The usage of the exponential stability theory can not only
ensure the stable operation of the LFC scheme under DoS
attacks, but also provide better performance in system
frequency response than the schemes in Dong et al. [2012]
and Liu et al. [2019].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 gives the switching system model of LFC for a single-
area power system. Section 3 proposes an LFC design
algorithm. In Section 4, a case study based on a single-
area power system is shown to verify effectiveness of the
proposed LFC scheme. Conclusion is given in Section 5.
2. SWITCHING LFC MODEL FOR A SINGLE-AREA
POWER SYSTEM
This section describes a switching LFC model for single-
area power system. At first, a linear LFC model for single-
area power system is introduced under open communica-
tion network. Then, a detailed descriptions of modeling a
switching LFC model is illustrated under the DoS attacks.
Fig. 1. LFC structure of a single-area power system.
2.1 Single-area power system
As shown in Fig. 1, the dynamic LFC model of single-area
power system can be expressed as follows (Zhang et al.
[2013a]):
ẋ(t) = Āx(t) + B̄u(t) + F̄ω(t) (1)
where
xT = [∆f, ∆Pm, ∆Pv], u = ∆PC , ω = ∆Pd
Ā =
 − DM 1M 00 − 1Tch 1Tch
− 1RTg 0 −
1
Tg








and ∆f,∆Pm,∆Pv,∆Pd are the deviation of frequency,
generator mechanical output, valve position, and load,
respectively; M,D, Tg, Tch, R represent the moment of in-
ertia of generator unit, generator unit damping coefficient,
time constant of the governor, time constant of the turbine,
and speed droop, respectively.
In the LFC scheme, in order to force the steady state of ∆f
to tend to zero, the integral of ∆f is used as an additional
state. It is defined as ∆E = KI
∫
∆fd(t), where KI is
the gain of integral controller. Redefine the state vector as
xT = [∆f ∆Pm ∆Pv ∆E]. Then system (1) is written as
















The balance point’s inner stability of the system (2) is
equivalent to the origin’s stability with ω(t) = 0. Thus, the
state-space model studied in this paper can be summarized
as follows
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (3)
2.2 Modeling for LFC under energy-limited DoS attacks
Firstly, we assume that the actuator is periodical time-
triggered, while the controller is event-triggered. Assume
that the LFC system is subjected to DoS attacks under
[kT, (k+m)T ], where T is the sampling period of the sensor
and m ∈ M , {1, 2, · · · , M̄}, M̄ is the largest integer in
the finitely set M . The value m describes the duration
of the DoS attacks, and the M̄ is the largest one of the
durations. Here, a new sampling time t0, t1, · · · , tl, l ∈ N
is defined as the updated time of controller signals, then
the set of new sampling period of system (3) is hk = tk+1−
tk ∈ MT with k ∈ N . Then, the LFC system (3) can be
rewritten as follows:
ẋ(t)=Ax(t)+αBu(tk)+(1−α)Bu(tk−1), t = [tk, tk+1) (4)
where, α = 0 or 1, and α = 0 denotes the system is
subjected to DoS attacks; α = 1 denotes the system is
not subjected to DoS attacks.
In order to alleviate the impact of DoS attacks, we will
reconstruct LFC system model in terms of execution
period of the actuator. Assume that T0 = T/n and T0 is
the execution period of the actuator. Then, the sampling
period of system (4) ismnT0. The detailed time slots under
DoS attacks are shown in Fig. 2. From this diagram, it
can be seen that two control signals u (tk−1) and u (tk)
exist simultaneously in the time interval of hk. Assume
the durations of the two control signals are $1(k)T0 and
$0(k)T0, respectively. That is hk = $1(k)T0 +$0(k)T0 =
mnT0.
Fig. 2. Time slots of an LFC process under DoS attacks
Then, based on the above analysis, the system (4) can be
rewritten the following discrete model.
x (tk+1)=A(hk)x(tk)+B (hk)u (tk)+B(hk−1)u(tk−1) (5)
where A (hk) = e




















































0B0. Then, the system (5) is equivalent to
x (tk+1)=A
mn








In the above model, when m,n is given, $1(k) can take
different values in the set H = {0, 1, 2, · · · ,mn} to make
the system (6) exist in different forms. Therefore, the
above system can be rewritten as the following switching
system model.










and Aoσ(tk) = A
mn
0 , and σ (tk) ∈ H is the switching signal.
Noted that if $1(k) = 0, the subsystem is not subjected
to DoS attacks, and meanwhile Bo0 = B0, B̃o0 = 0, and
Ao0 = A0. Also, when $1(k) = mn, the subsystem will be
subjected to DoS attacks with the largest duration for any
m ∈M , and Bomn = 0, B̃omn = B0, and Aomn = Amn0 .
Lastly, we choose the following state-feedback control law
as shown in Fig. 1.
u (tk) = Kx (tk) (8)
Combining the system (7) and control law (8), the closed
switching system of LFC for single-area power system can
be obtained as follows:
Scσ(tk) : x (tk+1) = Aσ(tk)x (tk) +Bσ(tk)x (tk−1) (9)
where Aσ(tk) = Aoσ(tk) +Boσ(tk)K,Bσ(tk) = B̃oσ(tk)K.
3. DESIGN OF LFC SCHEME WITH DOS ATTACKS
In this section, a design method of LFC scheme for a single-
area power system with DoS attacks is introduced. An
exponential stability conditions are presented to assure the
stability of the LFC of power system. Then, a theorem of
controller design is proposed based on the above stability
conditions. At last, a design procedure for LFC scheme is
summarised.
3.1 Stability Criterion and Controller Design Method of
LFC Scheme for A Single-Area Power System
Assume that the total activation number of stable and
unstable subsystems over the time [t0, tk) are denoted Gs




are the existing frequencies of the stable and
unstable subsystems, respectively. Assume that system (9)
has s+1 stable subsystems, and Sj , j = Hs = {0, 1, · · · , s}
are the stable ones. So, the system has mn − s unstable
subsystems, and Sj , j = Hu = {s + 1, s + 2, · · · ,mn}
are the unstable ones. Then, we can derive the following
theorem (referring to Zhang et al. [2008]).
Theorem 1. For given scalars λj > 0, λa = max(λj |j ∈
Hs), λb = max(λj |j ∈ Hu), µ ≥ 1, and λ < 1 with
λa < λ < λb, if there exist appropriate matrixes Pj ≥ 0,
Qj ≥ 0, j ∈ H such that the following inequalities hold
Ξj=
[
ATj PjAj − λ2Pj +Qj ATj PjBj
BTj PjAj B
T
j PjBj − λ2jQj
]
< 0 (10)
Pα ≤ µPβ , Qα ≤ µQβ , α, β ∈ H (11)
fs
fu
≥ lnλb − lnλ
lnλ− lnλa
(12)




where Ta is the average dwell time as defined in Lemma
4 in Appendix A. Then, the system (9) is exponentially
stable with exponential decay rate ρ (λ, Ta) = λµ
1/(2Ta).
The proof is shown in Appendix A.
Remark 1: In real power system, the average dwell time
Ta cannot be determined in advance due to the variation
of DoS attacks. However, based on the definition of Ta in





then it can guarantee inequality (13) holds no matter how
DoS attacks change.
Due to fs + fu = 1, the inequality (12) can be rewritten
as follows:
fu ≤ f̄u ,
1
(lnλb − lnλ) / (lnλ− lnλa) + 1
(15)
When controller K in system (9) is unknown, Theorem
1 is no longer an LMI-based condition due to a product
of ATj PjBj . In order to obtain a feasible controller K,
the following Theorem 2 is shown to derive the controller
parameters.
Theorem 2. For preset scalars λj > 0, λa = max(λj |j ∈
Hs), λb = max(λj |j ∈ Hu), µ ≥ 1, and λ < 1 with
λa < λ < λb, if there exist appropriate matrices X, Υ,
Rj ≥ 0, Sj ≥ 0, j ∈ H, such that (14), (15) and the
following inequalities hold−λ2Rj + Sj 0 XTAToj + ΥTBToj∗ −λ2jSj ΥT B̃Toj
∗ ∗ −X −XT +Rj
 < 0 (16)
Rα ≤ µRβ , Sα ≤ µSβ , α, β ∈ H (17)
then system (9) is exponentially stable with a decay rate
ρ (λ, ta) = λµ
1/(2Ta), and the controller gains can be
calculated by
K = ΥX−1 (18)
The proof is shown in Appendix B.
3.2 Design Procedure of LFC Scheme for Single-area
Power System under energy-limited DoS attacks
In this subsection, we will introduce an algorithm to
present the design procedure of LFC scheme for single-area
power system under DoS attacks. The objective is to find
feasible controller gains K and λ. The detailed procedure
is shown as the following Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Find K and λ
Step 1:Preset system (4) parameters A, B, and sampling period
T0 of actuator and T = nT0 of sensor.
Step 2:Evaluate the largest duration and frequency of DoS attack,
denote mnT0 and fmax, respectively.
Step 3:Preset s + 1 stable subsystem; set λj with j ∈
{0, 1, · · · ,mn} and µ; then determine λa = max(λj |j ∈
Hs) and λb = max(λj |j ∈ Hu).
Step 4:Find K.
1)Check the feasibility of LMIs (16) and (17) under the given
µ and λj .
2) If (16) and (17) are true, determine feasible solutions of
X and Υ; else, go to Step 3 and modify λj .
3)Calculate K based on (18).
Step 5:Find λ.
1) Initialize λmin = λa, λmax = 1, and select the accuracy
coefficient λac = 0.0001.
2)Check the feasibility of inequalities (14) and f̄u ≥ fmax in
(15) under λtest = (λmin + λmax)/2.
3) If (14) and f̄u ≥ fmax are feasible, set λmin = λtest; else,
set λmax = λtest.
4) If |λmin − λmax| ≤ λac, set λ = λmin.
5) If λ > λa, obtain λ; else, go to Step 3 and modify λj .
Step 6:Output K and λ.
Remark 2: The selection of λj determines the control
performance of the designed frequency controller for the
single-area power system. In the Steps 4 and 5 of this
algorithm, we can design a feasible controller to resist the
possible DoS attack by adjusting appropriate values of λj .
4. A CASE STUDY
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach,
the case study has been carried out based on a single-
area power system. The dynamic model of LFC scheme
for the single-area power system is described in subsection
2.1 and is governed by (2). The standard nominal values
of the parameters are shown in Table 1 as reported in Liu
et al. [2019]. In this case studies, the updated period of
measurements and control signals in LFC process is set
to T = 3s. That is the sampling period of the sensor
of this system is 3s. Also, the execution period of the
actuator in LFC process is set to T0 = 1s, which means
that n = T/T0 = 3. Moreover, we simulate the system for
load disturbance (in pu)
∆Pd(t) =
{
0.06, 0s ≤ t < 100s
0.003 sin(0.3t), 100s ≤ t < 200s
−0.02, 200s ≤ t ≤ 300s
(19)
Table 1. Parameters of LFC scheme of single-
area power system
D M R Tg Tch KI
1 pu/Hz 10 pu·s 0.05 Hz/pu 0.1s 0.3s 1
4.1 LFC scheme design under known DoS attacks
In the following design procedure, the LFC schemes for
single-area power system are designed based on a known
DoS attack model. Assume that the LFC of the single-
area power system is subjected to the known DoS attack,
as shown in Fig. 3. Based on this diagram, one can obtain
that the largest durations is 9T0 = 3T . Also, the activated
switching subsystems consist of S0, S1, S3, S4, S5, S6,
S7, S8, and S9, and their detailed activated times are
59, 16, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 1 and 1, respectively. Then, we
can represent the interval of DoS attack in terms of new
sampling time [t0, t86), and obtain M = {1, 2, 3}, M̄ = 3
and H = {0, 1, · · · , 9}. Choose the stable subsystems is
S0. Next, based on the procedure of the algorithm in
section 3.2 and by setting µ = 1.001, λ0 = 0.40, λ1 = 1.2,
λ2 = 2.4, λ3 = 3.5, λ4 = 4.1, λ5 = 45.2, λ6 = 5.8, λ7 = 5.9,
λ8 = 6.3, and λ9 = 6.95 in every subsystem, respectively,
we can determine λa = 0.4 and λb = 6.95. Then, based on
Step 4 in Algorithm 1, we obtain a feasible controller gain
matrix K1 for the LFC scheme, and
K1 = [−2.7997− 0.0840− 0.0280− 5.8795]. (20)
Based on Step 5 in Algorithm 1, we can get λ = 0.9998.
Also, the maximum acceptable DoS attack frequency is
f̄u = 32.09%. From the detailed attacks durations in Fig.
3, we can obtain the real attack frequency is f = 27/86 ≈
31.40% < f̄u. Thus, by Theorem 2, the LFC scheme for
the single-area power system controlled by the designed
K1 is exponentially stable. Moreover, choose N0 = 0, and
the average dwell time Ta = 300/54 ≈ 5.3571s > T =
3s > t̄a = 2.2742 in (13) of Theorem 1. Thus, the system
has an exponential decay rate ρ = λµ1/(2Ta) = 0.9999.
4.2 Simulation Verification
To illustrate the effectiveness and superiority of the pro-
posed LFC scheme, we compared three LFC schemes to
defend DoS attacks:
1) the event-triggered H∞ LFC scheme considering only
the duration of DoS attacks in Liu et al. [2019], and the
proposed PI controller K2 = [−0.0571,−0.0109];
2) the robust LFC scheme without considering DoS attacks
in Dong et al. [2012], and the proposed PI controller
K3 = [−3.27e− 4,−0.3334];
3) the proposed LFC scheme considering the duration and
frequency of DoS attacks in this paper, the designed state-
feedback controller K1 as shown in equation (20).
The system controlled by the above three controllers is
tested under load disturbances ∆Pd(t). Deviation of fre-
quency of the power system are depicted in Fig. 4. It can
be seen that K1 can drive the system frequency back to the
scheduled frequency under load disturbances, and it takes
a shorter time and shows a smaller frequency deviation
than controllers K2 and K3.
Fig. 3. Detailed time slots of the known DoS attack
Fig. 4. Deviation of frequency of the single-area power
system under controllers K1, K2, and K3.
4.3 LFC scheme design under unknown DoS attacks
The diagram of DoS attacks can not be always determined
precisely. In this case, we can roughly estimate the max-
imum durations and frequency of DoS attacks to design
feasible LFC scheme based on Algorithm 1. Similarly, some
feasible parameters of λj can be selected to develop con-
troller gains of LFC scheme. Subsystem S0 is considered as
stable switching subsystem.With the aid of Theorem 2, we
calculated the maximum acceptable DoS attack frequency
of LFC scheme under different DoS attack durations and
actuator execution periods. The detailed results are shown
in Table 2. From this table, we can determine the feasibility
of the LFC scheme to defend certain DoS attacks as long as
the DoS attacks meet the calculated maximum durations
and attack frequency. The feasible controller gains of the
LFC scheme can be developed by Algorithm 1.
Table 2. Maximum acceptable DoS attack fre-
quency of LFC scheme under different DoS at-
tack durations and actuator execution periods
Durations m=1 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5
T/T0 = 3 49.95% 39.25% 32.09% 24.90% 22.33%
Remark 3: The proposed method can be easily extended
into multi-area power based on the decentralised strategy.
As noted in Dong et al. [2012] and Zhang et al. [2013a]
that the interactions between different areas can be treated
as disturbances. Therefore, the design of multi-area LFC
schemes under DoS attacks can be simplified to a repetitive
single-area design problem.
Remark 4: In this paper, the design of an LFC scheme
ignores the presence of communication delays in the trans-
mission of control signals and measurements. Yet the de-
lays are inevitable, and may affect the performance of LFC
scheme as noted in Zhang et al. [2013a] and Zhang et al.
[2013b]. So, in the future, we will improve the proposed
LFC scheme by considering communication delays.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an LFC scheme for single-area power system
has been investigated to defend an energy-limited DoS
attack based on switching method. By considering the
durations and frequency of DoS attacks, an exponential
stability criterion has been developed. A detailed proce-
dure has been proposed to design a feasible LFC scheme
by evaluating the durations and frequency of DoS attacks.
The proposed scheme has been tested on a single-area pow-
er system under a known DoS attack. The obtained results
have illustrated the effectiveness of the proposed LFC on
defending the DoS attack. Also, the results have shown
that the proposed scheme took a shorter time to recover
system frequency to the scheduled value and performed a
smaller frequency deviation than other schemes.
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Appendix A. PROOF FOR THEOREM 1
Firstly, some lemmas are shown as follows.
Lemma 3. System (9) is said to be exponentially stable
with exponential decay rate λ if for every finite initial state
x (t0) ∈ <n, there exist positive constants c and λ < 1 such
that the following inequality holds
‖x (tk)‖ ≤ cλtk ‖x (t0)‖ . (A.1)
Lemma 4. (Zhai et al. [2002]). For any switching signal
σ(tk) and any tk ≥ 1, let Nσ[t0, tk) denote the number
of switching points of σ(tk) over the time interval [t0, tk).
If Nσ[t0, tk) ≤ N0 + (tk − t0)/Ta holds for N0 ≥ 0 and
Ta > 0, then Ta is called the average dwell time and N0 te
chatter bound.
The subsystem of system (9) is Sj : x (tk+1) = Ajx (tk) +
Bjx (tk−1) , j ∈ H. Choose the following Lyapunov func-
tional for the subsystem.
Vj (tk) = x
T (tk)Pjx (tk) + x
T (tk−1)Qjx (tk−1) (A.2)
Denote η(tk) = [x
T (tk), x
T (tk−1)]
T . Then by using in-
equality (10), one can obtain that Vj (tk+1)− λ2jVj (tk) =
xT (tk+1)Pjx (tk+1)+x
T (tk)Qjx (tk)−λ2xT (tk)Pjx (tk)−
λ2xT (tk−1) Ξjx (tk−1) = η
T (tk) Ωjη (tk) < 0. That is to
say
Vj (tk+1) < λ
2
jVj (tk) . (A.3)
Then, for the whole switching system (9), we choose the
Lyapunov functional: Vσ(tk) (tk) = x
T (tk)Pσ(tk)x (tk) +
xT (tk−1)Qσ(tk)x (tk−1). For the switching signal σ(tk), we
let tk1 < · · · < tki, i ≥ 1 denote the switching points of
σ(tk) during the time interval [t0, tk). Note that the state
of system (9) does not jump at the switching points. Then
by applying inequality (11), one can obtain
Vσ(tki) (tki) ≤ µVσ(tk(i−1)) (tki) . (A.4)
Based on the definitions of fs and fu, the inequality (12)







≥ lnλb − lnλ
lnλ− lnλa
(A.5)
Combining λa < λ and (A.5), one can obtain that∑mn
j=0 nj lnλj =
∑r











lnλb = Gs lnλa +
Gu lnλb ≤ (Gs + Gu) lnλ =
∑mn
j=0 nj lnλ, where nj de-
notes the number of activation of subsystem Sj over




j ≤ λ2tk . By


















j Vσ(t0) (t0) ≤ µNσ[t0,tk)λ2tkVσ(t0) (t0)
= ρ2tk (λ, Ta)Vσ(t0) (t0), where ρ (λ, Ta) = λµ
1/(2Ta).
Then, we can obtain that ξ1 ‖x (tk)‖2 ≤ Vσ(tk) (tk) <
ρ2tk (λ, ta) ξ2 ‖x (t0)‖2, where ξ1 = minj∈H λmin (Pj) and
ξ2 = maxj∈H(λmax (Pj) + λmax(Qj)), and λmin(∆) and
λmax(∆) are, respectively, the maximum and minimum
eigenvalues of ∆. Calculating the above inequality, we
obtain ‖x (tk)‖ <
√
ξ2/ξ1ρ
tk (λ, Ta) ‖x (t0)‖. Also, the in-
equality (13) and λ < 1 guarantee ρ (λ, Ta) < 1. Therefore,
based on the Lemma 4, system (9) is exponentially stable
with an exponential decay rate ρ (λ, Ta). This completes
the proof.
Appendix B. PROOF FOR THEOREM 2
The following lemma is used to derive the theorem.
Lemma 5. (Hu et al. [2007]). For matrices Γ, P > 0, and
Q > 0, the inequality ΓTQΓ − P < 0 holds if and only if
there exists a matrix Y such that[
−P ΓTY T
Y Γ −Y − Y T +Q
]
< 0 (B.1)
Based on Lemma 6, inequality (10) holds if there exists a
matrix Y such that the following inequality holds−λ2Pj +Qj θ ATj Y∗ −λ2jQj BTj Y
∗ ∗ −Y − Y T + Pj
 < 0 (B.2)
Inequality (B.2) implies that Y is invertible. Denote X =
Y −1, Υ = KX, Rj = X
TPjX, and Sj = X
TQjX. Pre and
post multiply (B.2) by diagXT , XT , XT and diagX,X,X,
respectively. Then inequality (16) is obtained. So, if in-
equality (16) is true, (10) holds. Also, Pre and post multi-
ply inequalities Pα ≤ µPβ and Qα ≤ µQβ by XT and X,
respectively. Then, inequality (17) is obtained. If inequal-
ity (17) is true, (11) holds. Therefore, based on Theorem
1, as long as (13), (15), (16), and (17) hold, system (9) is
exponentially stable. This completes the proof.
